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Making Good Cybersecurity Law and Policy:
How Can We Get Tasty Sausage?
PAUL ROSENZWEIG*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we
know how they are made." This famous quote is often attributed to
Germany's Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Like so many things
that everyone "knows" to be true, the attribution is wrong; the words
were first written by John Godfrey Saxe, an American lawyer-poet.1
This short tale therefore serves a two-fold purpose as the
epigrammatic opening for a discussion of the cybersecurity
policymaking process. First, it directly reminds us that making laws
and policy is a hard, sometimes unseemly business, that may be
unpalatable to observe but which has many admirable and deeply
practical objectives; after all, every society needs metaphorical
sausages-good policy and good law. But the story also serves, at a
meta-level, as a cautionary tale that all of the things we think we know
to be true aren't necessarily so; and this is especially true in the realm
of cyberspace.
* Principal, Red Branch Consulting PLLC; Carnegie Fellow in National Security
Journalism, Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University (2011); Professorial
Lecturer in Law, George Washington University. The author served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security from 2005-09. Portions of
this article will appear in the forthcoming book Cyberwarfare: How Conflicts in
Cyberspace are Challenging American and Changing the World (Santa Barbara: Praeger,
2012). I am indebted to the participants at the Ohio State University symposium
"Cybersecurity: Shared Risks, Shared Responsibilities" and particularly to Jeffrey Hunker
and Peter Shane for their thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1 Fred R. Shapiro, "Quote ... Misquote," The New York Times, July 21, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/20o8/07/21/magazine/27wwl-guestsafire-t.html.
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Put another way, there are two different types of things that can go
wrong when Washington policy makers make cyber policy. One class
of mistake is analytically uninteresting (at least in the context of this
symposium)-they are the types of errors that are common to all sorts
of policy making in Washington today. There is a robust, detailed
academic literature on these types of problems: the difficulties of rent-
seeking in a regulated environment; the prevalence of information
asymmetries amongst actors; parochialism in decision-makers; and
the like. These are problems that are familiar to all our policymakers
and there is nothing unique about the cyber domain that exempts it
from these challenges. To put it prosaically and to cite but one
example of many, major telecommunications providers are neither
more nor less likely to lobby to protect their own financial interests
when the subject is cybersecurity than they are to seek favorable
decisions in the areas of telephony or cable access. And, precisely
because these challenges are no different for cyber policy than in any
other field they aren't terribly interesting in the context of a
symposium on cybersecurity policy. Other than noting them in
passing here, and without in any way minimizing the difficulties that
this sort of behavior poses for making good policy, I don't propose to
discuss them further.
Instead, this brief essay will focus on two more interesting
questions: First, whether or not there is a class of issues and
challenges in policy making that is unique to the cyber domain; and
second, whether there are issues that, if not unique, are more
predominant or readily apparent in the context of cyber policy making
than in other areas of governmental endeavor.
I submit that the answer to the question is "yes" on both accounts.
There are unique challenges that arise from the nature of the cyber
domain and from the failure of policy makers to adequately
understand and adapt to that nature. Two aspects of that nature in
particular have yet to be comprehended: the cyber domain's ubiquity
and rapidity; and its asymmetric empowerment.
Relatedly, there is a class of challenges that, though not unique to
the cyber domain are significantly exacerbated in that domain. These
are the types of challenges that are predominant in most public policy
making involving developing science and technology. They involve the
rapidity of change, policy makers' lack of familiarity with the
technology under development, and the unpredictability of future
developments.2 Our policy makers have yet to come to grips with the
2 In 2010, the author attended a senior level military cyber exercise at the Army War
College. The challenge of dealing with new technology that leaders did not understand was
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transformative scope of the technology and thus they have yet to
modify the policymaking apparatus to the reality of cyber systems.
II. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF CYBERSPACE -- UBIQUITY AND RAPIDITY
"The internet destroys both time and space."3 It is both global in
scope and near-instantaneous in operation. Until policy makers
understand and adapt to this unique environment they cannot readily
respond to it.
A. UBIQUITY
Cyberspace is everywhere. It pervades our economy and our
critical infrastructure. For example, the Department of Homeland
Security has identified eighteen sectors of the economy as the nation's
critical infrastructure and key resources. 4 This comprehensive list
covers everything from transportation to the defense industrial base.
It includes energy, financial systems, water, agriculture, and
telecommunications. Remarkably, virtually all of the sectors now
substantially depend on cyber systems. Even those activities most
solidly grounded in the physical world-such as manufacturing or
food production-have become reliant on computer controls and
access to the World Wide Web of information. Manufacturing systems
are controlled by computer systems operated at a distance through
virtual connections; farmers use global positioning system tracking,
satellite data, and just-in-time ordering to maintain their operations.
The list goes on.
At the same time, cyber systems have come to underpin many of
our social interactions. The cyber domain enables Facebook as a social
network and Twitter as an information source. Blogging and internet
video viewing are growing at an exponential pace and may soon
exceed television viewing and newspaper reading. Indeed, today,
well-encapsulated in the advice that was given to the attending senior officers: "If your
cyber-advisor is older than 35, you need a new advisor."
3 Remarks of Kim Taipale, Duke University Center on Law, Ethics and National Security
(April 2010), http://www.law.duke.edu/lens/conferences/20lo/program.
4 For a complete list, see Department of Homeland Security, "Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources Sectors,"
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS860a/CIKR/sectorMenu.htm.
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according to Internet World Stats, the number of Internet users
exceeds two billion, more than 30% of the world's population.5
In short, one fundamental characteristic of the Internet that makes it
truly different from the physical world is that it lacks any boundaries.
This creates a profound challenge for American policy makers because
their background is almost wholly derived from a state-based system
of sovereignty that is bounded in geographic space. By contrast the
reality is that cybersecurity is boundless and, thus, inevitably, an issue
of global concern.
In short, you can't be an American isolationist and make good
cyber policy. Significant instances of espionage have originated
overseas. 6 Some countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, have become
known as safe havens for cyber criminals.7 It can be anticipated that if
there ever is a cyber war, America's enemies will launch their attacks
from overseas sites that, initially, are beyond U.S. control.
Some countries have responded to this reality by attempting to cut
themselves off from the Internet or censor traffic arriving at their
cyber borders. The most notorious example is China's attempt to
construct a "Great Firewall" to keep Internet traffic out of the
country.8 China conducts an active effort to suppress adverse news on
the Internet, with more than three hundred thousand Internet
monitors engaged in the process.9 As a result the recent unrest in the
Middle East seems to be unable to find traction in China. The instinct
to regulate is not, however, limited to authoritarian regimes-even
5 Statistics regarding worldwide Internet usage are compiled by Internet World Stats,
http://Aw.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. This is an increase from just sixteen million
in 1995.
6 Public reports of the contents of cables released by Wikileaks suggested Chinese
complicity in several extensive cyber exploits. James Glanz and John Markoff, "Vast
Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web," New York Times, December 4, 2010,
http://wAw.nytimes.com/2010/12/O5/world/asia/o5wikileaks-china.html. The
underlying cables remain classified and the government has directed those people
(including this author), who have an active security clearances, to refrain from reviewing
the substance of the cables.
7John Barnham, "Russia's Cybercrime Haven," Security Management, November 2008,
http://wAw.securitymanagement.com/article/russias-cybercrime-haven-o04818.
8 To "test any website and see real-time if it's censored in China," see Great Fire Wall of
China, http://www.greatfirewallofchina.org.
9 L. Gordon Crovitz, "Opinion: Dictators and Internet Double Standards," Wall Street
Journal, March 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBloo1424o52 748 703 58ooo4 57 61806626 3 8333oo4.html.
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liberal Western countries like Australia have proposed restrictions on
Internet traffic, albeit for facially more legitimate reasons, such as
limiting the spread of child pornography. 10
But such strategies are, in the end, bootless. In the long run, they
will prove ineffective, and to the extent they are effective, they cut
countries off from the benefits of the Internet. The salient feature of
the cyber domain is precisely its ability to accumulate and integrate
large bodies of information over long distances in an instant. Any
country that erects effective cyber borders is systematically agreeing to
forgo those benefits, to its own detriment. While that might be feasible
for a totalitarian state, it will never work for America. And so,
inevitably, we are likely to remain deeply entwined in the global
network of cyberspace.
The problem, however, is that our policy structures and concepts
are not well suited to this reality. American tradition, going back
literally to our founding era, is about avoiding foreign
entanglements." We have, justifiably, a skeptical view of international
organizations and solutions.
Yet, because the cyber problem is a global one, America's strategy
must be to engage internationally, both cooperatively with friends and
allies, and punitively with those who refuse to prevent crime and
espionage at locations within their effective control. This will require a
greater willingness to share information and cooperate with
appropriate allies (such as the U.K.). America's primary focus should
be on working cooperatively thorough existing bilateral partnerships
and engaging effective international organizations (like NATO) .12 In
addition, the United States may need to take the lead in the
development of international norms and rules that presumptively
10 Associated Press, "Australia Says Web Blacklist Combats Child Porn," Physorg.com,
March 27, 2009, http://www.physorg.com/newsl57371619.html.
11 The most famous instance of this tradition, of course, is George Washington's Farewell
Address in 1796. "George Washington's Farewell Address in 1796," The Avalon Project-
Lillian Goldman Law Library, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/washing.asp. In
his farewell address, Washington warned his fellow citizens to "steer clear of permanent
alliances" and counseled that the "great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations
is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as
possible. ... [I]t must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary
vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships
or enmities."
12 William J. Lynn III, "Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy," Foreign
Affairs, September/October 2010, 97,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22849/defending-a-new-domain.
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assign liability to countries that harbor hackers (like Russia and
China). The policy mind-set we have today isn't quite ready for that
sort of engagement.
B. RAPIDITY
Cyber world is also a world of rapidity. The speed at which events
can happen in the cyber domain makes real world events seem
lugubrious; not only does the cyber domain span the globe, but it
does so in a near instantaneous fashion. There is no kinetic analog for
this phenomenon-even the most global-spanning weapons, like
missiles, take thirty-three minutes to reach their distant targets.
The concept of rapidity causes two distinct problems for policy
makers. Both are directly tied to the pace of action in cyberspace but,
confusingly, they point in opposite directions. On one hand, the pace
of action in cyberspace may seduce policy makers into believing that a
near-instantaneous response is necessary when, in fact, a more
measured response would be preferred. On the other hand, the speed
of events may leave decision makers far behind as their processes for
policy making are too slow to allow a timely response-a problem that
is not unique to cyberspace but it is exacerbated by its effects. The
difficulty in distinguishing the two circumstances is a confounding
factor that measurably complicates the challenge of dealing with cyber
rapidity.
C. THE NANO-SECOND POLICY
The rapidity of action in cyberspace teaches some policy makers a
lesson about the need to discard policy-making hierarchy. Reasoning
that human decisionmaking is too slow for cyberspace, they conclude
that rapidity of response will be the hallmark of cyber policy. This is
particularly true in the context of cyber warfare: When a cyber domain
attack or intrusion is perceived to occur at the pace of milliseconds,
some theorists argue that a response will need to occur with equal
rapidity.
As then-Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the first Commander
of U.S. Cyber Command, told the Senate during his confirmation
hearings, "[A] commander's right to general self-defense is clearly
established in both U.S. and international law. Although this right has
not been specifically established by legal precedent to apply to attacks
in cyberspace, it is reasonable to assume that returning fire in
cyberspace, as long as it complied with the law of war principles (e.g.
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proportionality), would be lawful."13 And what this means is that some
of the most influential leaders in the development of cyberspace policy
think that the need to respond immediately will necessarily drive
decision making down to lower levels in the chain of command.
Indeed, if you think that instantaneous self-defense is a necessity
this leads to the development of policy making requirements that will
inevitably result in important decisions being taken by subordinate
officials. To put it in a simplistic fashion, under this policy construct
the decision to go to cyber war with China may be made, not by the
President, but by a senior General who thinks that his command and
control system is under attack and elects to fire back.
There is good reason, however, to question whether the
assumptions of rapidity that lie behind the policy structure for
responding to attacks or intrusions are correct. As Martin Libicki
pointed out in a recent RAND study, a cyber response is unlikely to be
able to disable a cyber attacker completely. As a consequence, for
policy, "[m]ore important than [the] speed [of the response] is the
ability to convince the attacker not to try again. Ironically, for a
medium that supposedly conducts its business at warp speed, the
urgency of retaliation is governed by the capacity of the human mind
to be convinced, not the need to disable the attacking computer
before it strikes again."14
In some ways, this problem for the development of policies in the
cyber domain is akin to analogous challenge faced in other domains.
The issue is "how to sustain human control [that is, maintain a] man-
in-the-loop. . . . For example, control structures can have human
control to unlock weapons systems, or automatic system unlock with
human intervention required to override. An example of the former is
the control of nuclear weapons and of the later, the control of a
nuclear power reactor. This may be high tech, but the big questions
are political and organizational."15 Indeed, the problems associated
with internet rapidity and with the lack of human control structures or
13 "Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA Nominee for
Commander," United States Cyber Command in Hearings Before the United States Senate
Armed Services Committee, 24 (April 13, 2010), http://ww w.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/questions.pdf; Lynn, "Defending a New Domain," 103 (The U.S.
military must "respond to attacks as they happen or even before they arrive.").
14 See Martin Libicki, "Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar," 62, RAND (2009),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/20o9/RANDMG877.pdf (emphasis supplied).
15 Tom Blau, "War and Technology in the Age of the Electron," Defense Security Review 94
(1993):10oo.
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policy were demonstrated, in a painful fashion, recently when
automated trading rules caused a "flash crash"-a thousand point
decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in less than ten minutes
of trading on the New York Stock Exchange. 16 If we are going to avoid
similar, more harmful failures (one can, for example, imagine a "flash
war"), policy makers will need to come to grips with and learn to
defuse the incessant rapidity of cyberspace.
D. THE POLICY "FORD SEDAN"
By far the more common phenomenon (at least in my own limited
experience) arises when the pace of events in cyberspace moves so
quickly that policy cannot keep up.17 The problem, here, is a structural
one, rather than a systematic substantive challenge and is more
common whenever technological change needs to be accounted for.
Put simply, policy is made through policymaking institutions and our
institutions are bounded by existing processes and inherent
limitations. In a world in which notice and comment rulemaking18
takes eighteen to twenty-four months'9 to complete -during which
16 Nelson Schwartz and Louise Story, "Surge of Computer Selling After Apparent Glitch
Sends Stocks Plunging," New York Times, May 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/O5/o7/business/economy/o7trade.html?sq=machines%2
otake%2ocontrol%2omay%207%20201o&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=1&adxnnlx=1311103991-
oZnL8wRwWUXpqTGUEXyisQ.
17 As I've said, this problem is common to many science and technology questions. It may
also, amusingly, arise in connection with more prosaic social phenomenon: "Fitness fads
change too quickly for anyone to keep up with all of them." NU FitRec at 2 (Spring-
Summer 2011) (on file with author).
i8 The Administrative Procedures Act requires new rules and regulations to be subject to
notice to the public and comment thereon. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq.
19 This is, of course, just an estimate. One study, Stuart Shapiro,, "Explaining Ossification:
An Examination of the Time to Finish Rulemakings" (working paper, Social Science
Research Network, August 11, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447337, estimated that
the median time for completion of a rule, from its first appearance in the Unified Agenda to
promulgation was 618 days, while the mean was 831 (or 27+ months). If one counts from
the date the rule is first formally proposed the mean is only 324 days, but my own
experience is that significant rules require substantial pre-proposal consideration and
consultation. For complex rules that will engender significant comment (as we can
anticipate will be the case with cyber rules) my assumption is that longer periods of
consideration will be necessary more frequently than shorter periods.
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time the average processing speed of computer chips will have
doubled-our system for making policy is ill-suited to the task.2o
Any number of examples of this phenomenon could readily be
cited, but the recent revolutionary movements in the Middle East are
a particularly good example of the accelerating pace of events enabled
by cyberspace. The Internet gives non-state actors the ability to
communicate rapidly and organize (to, in effect, have an organic
command and control system) that begins to rival that of sovereigns.
Consider: On January 25, the people of Egypt took to the streets in
a "day of rage," protesting the rampant poverty, unemployment, and
government corruption seen throughout the country. The young
rebels in the crowds used social media to mobilize the people. One
Facebook page dedicated to a protest, for instance, had over eighty
thousand followers.21 Through exchanges with Tunisian protesters,
they learned how to reduce the effects of tear gas on their eyes by
putting "vinegar or onion under your scarf."22 And the origins of the
resistance lay even more deeply in social coordination-bloggers in
Egypt tried to organize local strikes against the government and they,
in turn, energized youthful bloggers in Tunis.
The governments in the Middle East were slow to respond and did
so with little subtlety. One day after the revolt in Egypt started
Facebook, Twitter, Gmail, and YouTube were shut down, and the cell
phone company Vodaphone suspended service. The day after that
Egypt's five main Internet service providers cut off international
access to their customers.23 While the government claimed it was not
20 Though the rapidity of action in cyberspace greatly exacerbates the problems of
hierarchy in our policy-making process, those problems are not limited to cyber issues. As
the Project for National Security Reform put it in a recent report: "The legacy structures
and processes of a national security system that is now more than 6o years old no longer
help American leaders to formulate coherent national strategy. ... As presently constituted,
too, these structures and processes lack means to detect and remedy their own
deficiencies." Project for National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, November
20o8, http://pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr forging a-new shield report.pdf, i.
21 Maggie Michael, "Egyptians Plan First Tunisian-Inspired Protests, Draw 8o,ooo
Supporters on Facebook," StarTribune, January 24, 2011,
http://ww w.startribune.com/world/114479579.html.
22 David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Sanger, "A Tunisian-Egyptian Link that Shook Arab
History," New York Times, February 13, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/world/middleeast/14egypt-tunisia-
protests.html? r=i&ref=todayspaper.
23 Christopher Rhodes and Geoffrey A. Fowler, "Egypt Shuts Down Internet, Cell Phone
Service," Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424o527487o395660457611o45337136974o.html.
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responsible for killing the Internet, efforts seemed targeted
specifically to quell the uprising. A few days later, the government
apparently gave up, restoring service.24
Within a few short weeks, Mubarak had been ousted from his
Presidency and Egypt began a transition to some new form of
government, though the final resolution of the Egyptian crisis has yet
to be determined. Social media services have come back on line, and
appear to be a continuing part of the effort to transform the country.
And Egypt may only be the start of a larger phenomenon. As one
leader in Egypt, Walid Rachid, said: "Tunis is the force that pushed
Egypt, but what Egypt did will be the force that will push the world."
He, and others in his movement, dream of sharing their experiences
with similar youth movements in Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Iran.25
These unfolding events are a vivid example of how the cyber domain
creates social change at a dizzying pace-in this case, to quite literally
challenge a sovereign government backed by law enforcement and
military power. Not only were the Middle Eastern nations unable to
adapt, but one has a clear sense that our own policy-making in the
United States was left behind the curve of events. For weeks, as the
democracy movement grew, America was slow to respond, leaving
many to wonder if our diplomacy was "too little, too late."26 To be
sure, the shock of change in the Middle East might have overwhelmed
our decision making even at a slower pace; but there can be little
doubt that the cyber-infused rapidity of events made the job
significantly more challenging.
A number of other cyber examples of this phenomenon can be
readily identified. Here are a few as follows: Product life cycles in the
cyber domain are notoriously short. New chips, new processors, and
24 Shereen El Gazzar, "Government Restores Internet Service After a Weeklong Shutdown,"
Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424o5274870396o8O4576119690514692446.html.
25 Kirkpatrick and Sanger, "Egyptians and Tunisians Collaborated to Shake Arab History"
(see n. 22).
26 Literally dozens of articles could be cited for the proposition. For a relatively non-
tendentious example see Rachel Newcomb, "Why Obama's Position on Egypt's Mubarak
Was Too Little, Too Late," Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2011,
http://ww w.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0202/Why-Obama-s-position-
on-Egypt-s-Mubarak-was-too-little-too-late.
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new software are released on a seeming continuous basis. One good
example of our inability to deal with the rapidity of events in
cyberspace is our systematic failure to develop a procurement system
that allows the purchase of cutting edge information technology for
our military.27 Despite years of effort to streamline the process, we still
face the "fundamental problem ... that the deliberate process through
which weapon systems and information technology are acquired does
not match the speed at which new IT capabilities are being introduced
into today's new information age."28
Similarly, our response to cyber crime has been mired in
traditional modes of international cooperation. The Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime29 creates two distinct yet interrelated
obligations on its signatories. First, every nation signing the
Convention is obligated to adopt criminal law provisions that
substantively punish those who illegally access or use computers.
Second, each nation is also obliged to adopt procedures for sharing
information about criminal activity, preserving evidence and
extraditing identified offenders. As with most such conventions, the
precise contours of these substantive and procedural laws are left to
the discretion of each signatory.
But the Convention's provisions and procedures are widely
regarded as unpopular, ineffective, slow, and cumbersome. It took
years to negotiate the Treaty and today, eight years after its adoption,
only 27 countries have ratified it (while several whose cooperation is
necessary in any global regime-most notably China and Russia-have
refused to accede to the Treaty). The convergence of criminal law has
been a slow process. Significant cultural and legal hurdles (e.g.
differing American and European approaches to "hate" speech) have
further delayed the effort.
More importantly, the Treaty relies on outmoded means of
information exchange, including a process of Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (MLATs) and "letters rogatory" that dates back to the 18th
century. As three senior PayPal executives recently explained: "In all
of the cases where we have worked with multi country investigations,
we have never seen a case in which the data has been returned to the
27 See Defense Science Board, Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the
Acquisition ofInformation Technology, March 2009,
http://ww w.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA498375.pdf.
28 Ibid.,3 (Memorandum from William Schneider, Jr., DSB Chairman).
29 The treaty was first adopted in 2001. Its text is available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.
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requesting law enforcement agency in under three months. Six
months is more common, and we have heard of cases where the data
has been returned more than two years after it was originally
requested."3o If ever there wasa perfect example of how policy and
law have not kept up with the pace of cyber reality, this would be it.
The Treaty would be far more effective had it adopted more rapid
response mechanisms that work in real-time. The technology for such
an effort is readily available in the current interconnected
environment.
Finally, consider the Administration's recent cybersecurity
legislative proposal.31 This proposal was, itself, the product of many
years work, dating back to the Bush Administration. Within the
current Administration it was more than two years in the crafting-
something to be expected given the complexity of the topic and the
significant equities at issue.
But the very slowness of that process will, quite possibly, be the
downfall of the proposal. Some of it was outdated even before it was
proposed. For example, the Administration draft relies heavily on
authorization for the deployment of an intrusion detection and
prevention system. 32 But cyber experts are generally of the view that
intrusion systems are becoming out of date. As one expert, put it: "The
attackers are two years ahead of the defenders, security vendors, who
are two years ahead of market, which is two years ahead of
compliance, and legislation is five years behind that... .These practices
may be even more stale once enacted. It's unlikely the law could ever
keep pace, given the glacial pace of legislation."33
In short, our hierarchical decision-making structures remain
dominant and operate far too slowly to catch up with the pace of cyber
activity. Our policymaking apparatus can't turn inside the cyberspace
innovation radius. Or, as one of my colleagues has put it, the
3oBarrett, Steingruebel, and Smith, Combating Cybercrime: Policies, Principles and
Programs,, April 2011, ,https://www.paypal-
media.com/assets/pdf/fact sheet/PayPal CombatingCybercrime WP-0411 v4.pdf, 16-
17 (emphasis in original).
31 The text of this draft proposal, transmitted to Congress in May 2011, is available at
http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/Law-Enforcement-
Provisions-Related-to-Computer-Security-Full-Bill.pdf.
32 Ibid., 24.
33 "White House Cybersecurity Plan Feared Inadequate By Experts, Could Violate Privacy,"
E-commercealert.com, May 17, 2011,, http://ww w.e-commercealert.com/articlelo67.shtml
(quoting Josh Corman, Research Director, 451 Group).
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government is using a "Ford sedan" policymaking system to manage
the cyberspace "Porsche" system. 34
In the end, then, the issue of rapidity seems to look in two
directions at the same time. On one hand, we need structures in place
that slow down our responses in time of crisis and allow the time for
mature consideration lest we overreact to a situation in haste. On the
other hand, as is often the case when technological change is at hand,
some of our long-term policy making structures are so slow-moving
that we risk being left behind, caught up in a mode of thought (built
when sovereign states acted in a kinetic world) that no longer reflects
the dominant reality of our new systems.
III. ASYMMETRIC EMPOWERMENT
The other piece of the puzzle lies in the unique capacity of
cyberspace to allow and enable individuals (or groups of individuals)
to compete with more established social institutions. We see this
happening around the world with increasing frequency, and
governmental institutions have only begun to realize what a challenge
is posed to their monopolies on information and power by the growth
of the Internet. A rough taxonomy of the issue would identify at least
three distinct ways in which this sort of asymmetric empowerment
can be effectuated: through better coordination (as seen in the Middle
East example just noted); through greater access to information; and
through the enablement of non-state actors to compete directly with
sovereigns.
One vivid example (and one that may portend significant
challenges to the hegemony of the current social order) lies in the two-
stage challenge to social authority arising from the events surrounding
WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange. Their story is one of both
enhanced information transparency and, in the end, the ability to
wage combat in cyberspace.
34 I am indebted to Professor Harvey Rishikof, Chair of the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Law and National Security, for this wonderful image. Quoting him
also illustrates the proposition in a self-referential way. Like many in Washington,
Professor Rishikof also has a government affiliation. If I had wanted to identify him by that
affiliation, he would have required a week or more to get the requisite clearances from
other officials. As a private sector actor, he authorized reliance on his imagery immediately.
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A. "No MORE SECRETS"
The transparency aspect of the story is well known and widely
remarked on. Using a series of servers and an anonymization protocol
WikiLeaks accepts and publishes documents provided to it by sources
within governments.35 Though the site has published documents with
provenance as wide ranging as Zambia and Abu Dhabi, its most
notable (or perhaps notorious) publications have involved a number
of American documents, including the video of a war-time friendly fire
incident, raw tactical intelligence from the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan, and a trove of classified State Department cables.36
Opinions vary as to the efficacy of WikiLeaks transparency efforts.
To be sure some of the most apocalyptic predictions (that nobody
would talk to American diplomats ever again) have proven over
blown. On the other hand, reliable reports suggest that the WikiLeaks
disclosures have had significant public repercussions, ranging from
increased tensions in US-Mexican relations,37 to threats to the leader
of the Zimbabwean opposition leader,38 to reports that the Taliban
have collated a list of people who helped the United States and have
targeted them for killing.39 Indeed, some analysts have even said that
the public disclosure of America's opinion of the Tunisian leader
played a role in catalyzing the Tunisian rebellion that sparked the
current surge in Middle East unrest.40 It would be easy to overstate
35 A more detailed description of how WikiLeaks achieves technical anonymity can be
found at WikiLeaks, "About WikiLeaks," http://www.wikileaks.ch/About.html. WikiLeaks
asserts that it does not solicit disclosures and declines to disclose details of its submission
process in order to avoid "compromise" of the organization.
36 For an account of Wikileaks association with the New York Times, see Bill Keller,
"Dealing With Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets," New York Times, January 30, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/3o/magazine/3oWikileaks-t.html?ref= todayspaper.
37 Mary Beth Sheridan, "Calderon: WikiLeaks Caused Severe Damage to U.S.-Mexico
Relations," Washington Post, March 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/o3/AR201103o302853.html?wpisrc=n1 buzz.
38 David Smith, "Morgan Tsvangirai Faces Possible Zimbabwe Treason Charge," The
Guardian, December 27, 2010,
http://ww w.guardian.co.uk/world/2olo/dec/27/wikileaks-morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-
sanctions?CMP=twt _gu.
39 Keller, "The Times' Dealings With Julian Assange," 9.
40 Maha Azzam, "Opinion: How WikiLeaks Helped Fuel Tunisian Revolution," CNN.com,
January 18, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-
18/opinion/tunisia.wikileaks 1 tunisians-wikileaks-regime?_s=PM:OPINION.
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the case, but it seems clear that we increasingly live in a world where
secrecy is losing ground to transparency, with significant effects.41
To be sure, this problem is not unique to cyberspace. But the
availability of transparency enhancing technology in the cyber domain
will increase the frequency and salience of transparency in our public
discourse. Put simply, there is a significant difference in degree
between the leak of the Pentagon Papers42 to the New York Times
and the massive data-dumps practiced by WikiLeaks. This difference
in degree borders on a difference in kind and it will require a sea-
change in how our national security system operates-one for which it
is not well-prepared.
As a recent American Bar Association report put it: "The national
security community traditionally relies upon information monopoly
providing it with strategic advantage. This assumes that that the
government has information that its competitors or adversaries do
not. Given the ubiquity of information in open sources, the irresistible
benefits that come from networking information, and the vulnerability
of cyberspace, this assumption should be seriously challenged inside
and outside of government. It is increasingly likely that others will
have the same information, either because they have stolen it from
you or because they have been able to develop it independently."43
Policy makers (especially in the national security domain) have long
been accustomed to making policy behind closed doors and our
structures for policy making presume that capacity. Though, to be
sure, we have long had to accommodate the process to occasional
leaks of information (some of great significance) the transparency of
cyberspace reflects a quantum change in those expectations for which
our policymaking institutions are not ready.
B. No MORE SOVEREIGNS?
41 Scott Shane, "Keeping Secrets WikiSafe," New York Times, December 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/weekinreiew/12shane.html?_r=l&scp=5&sq= wikil
eaks&st= cse.
42 National Archives, Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force,
1967,, http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers.
43 American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, No More
Secrets: National Security Strategies for a Transparent World, March 2011,
http://ww w.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/1aw national security/no
more secretS2.authcheckdam.pdf, 4.
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The second part of the story, and perhaps the more interesting
part, revolved around the reaction to Mr. Assange's arrest in Great
Britain and the decision of many companies to sever financial
relationships with Wikileaks. What happened next was novel. As
Professor Clay Shirky has put it: "The competitive landscape [got]
altered because the Internet allow[ed] insurgents to play by different
rules than incumbents."44
Confronted with WikiLeak's anti-sovereign slant, the institutions
of the traditional status quo soon responded. Of course, none of the
governments ordered any actions (or, more accurately, none is known
to have), but the combination of governmental displeasure and public
relations disdain soon led a number of major Western corporations
(MasterCard, PayPal, and Amazon, to name three) to withhold
services from WikiLeaks. Amazon reclaimed rented server space that
WikiLeaks had used and the two financial institutions stopped
processing donations made to WikiLeaks.45
What soon followed might well be described as the first cyber
battle between non-state actors. Supporters of WikiLeaks, loosely
organized in a group under the name "Anonymous" (naturally) began
a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the web-
sites of the major corporations that they thought had taken an anti-
WikiLeaks stand.46 The web site of the Swedish prosecuting authority
(who is seeking Mr. Assange's extradition to Sweden to face criminal
charges) was also hacked. Some of the coordination for the DDoS
attacks was done through other social media, such as Facebook or
Twitter.47 Meanwhile, other supporters created hundreds of mirror
44 Clay Shirky, "From Innovation to Revolution," Foreign Affairs, March 2011,
http://wAw.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67325/malcolm-gladwell-and-clay-shirky/from-
innov ation-to-revolution?cid= emc-marl1promoa-content-03o811.
45 Ashlee Vance, "WikiLeaks Struggles to Stay Online After Cyberattacks," New York
Times, December 3, 2010,
http://wAw.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/europe/o4domain.html? r=i&ref=world.
46 John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya, "Hackers Attack Those Seen As WikiLeaks Enemies,"
New York Times, December 8, 2010,
http://wAw.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/o9wiki.html?ref=todayspaper; Joby Warrick
and Rob Pegoraro, "WikiLeaks Avoids Shutdown as Supporters Worldwide Go On the
Offensive," Washington Post, December 8, 2010, http://w'A'w.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/o8/AR2olol2o804o38.html?hpid= moreheadlines.
47 Ashlee Vance and Miguel Helft, "Hackers Give Web Companies a Test of Free Speech,"
New York Times, December 8, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/technology/o9net.html?_r=1&hp.
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sites, replicating WikiLeaks content, so that it couldn't be effectively
shut down.48 The hackers even adopted a military-style nomenclature,
dubbing their efforts "Operation Payback."
And the other side fought back. The major sites used sophisticated
cybersecurity methodology to oppose the Anonymous attacks. Most
attacks were relatively unsuccessful-the announced attack on
Amazon, for example, was abandoned shortly after it began because
the assault was ineffective. Perhaps even more tellingly, someone (no
group has, to my knowledge, publicly claimed credit) began an
offensive cyber operation against Anonymous itself. The group which
ran its operations through a website, AnonOps.net, was subject to
DDoS counterattacks that took it offline for a number of hours.49 In
short, a conflict readily recognizable as a battle between competing
forces took place in cyberspace waged, exclusively between non-state
actors.50
The failure of Anonymous to effectively target corporate web sites
and its relative vulnerability to counter-attack are, I think, only
temporary circumstances. They (and their opponents) will learn from
this battle and approach the next one with a greater degree of skill and
a better perspective on how to achieve their ends. Indeed, since the
initial PayPal attacks, a low-grade conflict has continued-the CIA
website has been attacked by LulzSec (another hacktivist group)51 and
Anonymous hacked the government contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton
48 Ravi Somaiya, "Hundreds of WikiLeaks Mirror Sites Appear," New York Times,
December 6, 2010.,
http://ww w.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/world/europe/o6wiki.html? r=i&ref= world.
49 Christopher Walker, "A Brief History of Operation Payback," Salon.com, December 9,
2010, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/12/O9/o.
50 The sovereign states were not, of course, mere bystanders. Dutch police, for example,
arrested one suspected member of Anonymous. Tim Hwang, "WikiLeaks and the Internet's
Long War," Washington Post, December 12, 2010, http://ww w.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/lo/AR2010121oo2604.html?hpid= opinionsboxi. The
Spanish recently arrested three more, charged with the Sony Play Station hack. David Jolly
and Raphael Minder, "Spain Detains 3 in PlayStation Cyberattacks," New York Times,
June 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/o6/11/technology/11hack.html?_r=2. And,
nobody can be certain that the counter-attacks on AnonOps.net were not state-authorized
or state-initiated.
s Mathew J. Schwartz, "LulzSec Claims Credit for CIA Site Takedown,"
Informationweek.com, June 16, 2011,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/cybercrime/23o8ooo9.
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stealing 90,ooo email addresses and passwords.52 In return,
governments have moved against the groups, recently arresting 16
members of Anonymous and charged them with crimes in connection
with the original PayPal attack.53
Anonymous has made quite clear that it intends to continue to
prosecute the cyberwar against, among others, the United States. "It's
a guerrilla cyberwar-that's what I call it," according to Barrett Brown,
29, a self-described senior strategist and "propagandist" for
Anonymous.54 "It's sort of an unconventional asymmetrical act of
warfare that we're involved in, and we didn't necessarily start it. I
mean, this fire has been burning." Or, consider, the manifesto posted
by Anonymous, declaring cyberspace independence from world
governments: "I declare the global social space we are building
together to be naturally independent of the tyrannies and injustices
you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do
you possess any real methods of enforcement we have true reason to
fear."55 In advancing this agenda, the members of Anonymous look
very much like the anarchists who led movements in the late 1 9 th and
early 2 0 th centuries-albeit anarchists with a vastly greater network
and far more ability to advance their nihilistic agenda through
individual action.56
This is a novel challenge to the traditional model of conflict
between state actors. The problem of dealing with non-state actors
52 Nancy Gohring, "Anonymous Hacks Booz Allen, Posts 90K Email Addresses and
Passwords," ComputerWorld.com, July 11, 2011,
http://ww w.computerworld.com/s/article/9218328/Anonymous-hacks Booz Allen pos
ts_90K military email addresses-and passwords.
s Jana Winter, "16 Suspected 'Anonymous' Hackers Arrested in Nationwide Sweep,
Foxnews.com, July 19, 2011, http://wwx-.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/07/19/exclusive-fbi-
search-warrants-nationwide-hunt-anonymous.
54 Michael Isikoff, "Hacker Group Vows 'Cyberwar' on U.S. Government, Business,"
msnbc.com, March 8, 2011,
http://ww w.msnbc.msn.com/id/4197219o/ns/technology and science-security.
55 The manifesto was posted as a YouTube video: "Anonymous to the Governments of the
World," YouTube.com, April 25, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbqC8BnvVHQ.
56 See Abe Greenwald, "The Return of Anarchism," Commentary, March 2011, 32.. One
possible additional point of comparison is that the 19th century anarchists were well
known for their internal disputes. Much the same may happen to Anonymous, as recent
reports of internal divisions suggests. "Trouble in Paradise for Hacker Group
Anonymous?," ITAC Blog, March 23, 2011, http://itacidentityblog.com/trouble-in-
paradise-for-hacker-group-anonymous.
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like Anonymous resembles, in structure, the problem of dealing with a
non-state insurgency on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan. But, there
are significant differences between the two domains. In the "kinetic"
world, the goal of an insurgency is often the overthrow of an existing
government. As the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual puts
it: "Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use
of subversion and armed conflict. An insurgency is an organized,
protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control
and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or
other political authority while increasing insurgent control."57 In other
words, the kinetic insurgency is grounded in the traditional
conception of sovereignty.
The cyber-insurgency is not. Anonymous-like insurgents seem to
have a different aim-"independence" from government. That
independence is premised on weakening political authority over the
cyber domain. Given the difference in goals, our policy makers will
need to learn to deal with a different reality. Operationally, the cyber-
insurgency challenges pose many of the same problems as do kinetic
insurgencies-how to isolate fringe actors from the general populace
and deny them support and refuge and, most of all, the freedom to
attack at the time and place of their choosing. But strategically, the
differences will be significant.
The hegemony of nation-states has been the foundation for
international relations since the Peace of Westphalia.58 The natural
first reaction of those nation-states will be an effort to reassert their
sovereignty over the internet.59 But their success in those efforts is
radically contingent, and it may be that the better policy is to adapt
rather than to resist the changes wrought by the asymmetry of
cyberspace. Here, as with the ubiquity problem, our decision makers
are bound up in a conception of the world that isn't readily susceptible
to change and may constrain our ability to make good policy.
57 Department of the Army, "Counterinsurgency," FM 3-24, December 2006, 1-2,
http://ww w.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
s8 The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended the 30-Years War. It is often considered
the international agreement that recognized the sovereignty of nation states. The text of the
treaty is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th-century/westphal.asp.
59 Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, "Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,"
Strategic Studies Quarterly 32 (Spring 2011),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/demchak-dombrowski.pdf.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If the question about cyberspace is: "What is our policy making
apparatus most likely to misunderstand or get wrong?" the answer, I
fear, is quite a lot. Not because policy makers in Washington are ill-
meaning, or venal, or even unintelligent. But rather, I fear, because
they are confronting a new reality to which they have yet to adapt.
The sausage making process of policy development inside sovereign
governments is slow and encrusted with hierarchical restrictions. It
lacks the pace and capacity to keep up with the ever-changing
environment of the Internet.
Worse, policy makers continue to think of the Internet as just
another tool-sort of like a telephone, but quicker. But the things that
"everybody knows" are changing every day. Until we come to grips
with the ubiquity and rapidity of the Internet and the fundamental
way in which the Internet creates asymmetries that empower the
individual to the disadvantage of the nation-state, we won't really
build good cyber policy. It's a daunting task-but no easier for putting
off to the future.
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